Abstract-Universal security over a network with linear network coding has been intensively studied. However, previous linear codes and code pairs used for this purpose were linear over a larger field than that used on the network, which restricts the possible packet lengths of optimal universal secure codes, does not allow to apply known list-decodable rank-metric codes and requires performing operations over a large field. In this work, we introduce new parameters (relative generalized matrix weights and relative dimension/rank support profile) for code pairs that are linear over the field used in the network, and show that they measure the universal security performance of these code pairs. For one code and non-square matrices, generalized matrix weights coincide with the existing Delsarte generalized weights, hence we prove the connection between these latter weights and secure network coding, which was left open. As main applications, the proposed new parameters enable us to: 1) Obtain optimal universal secure linear codes on noiseless networks for all possible packet lengths, in particular for packet lengths not considered before, 2) Obtain the first universal secure list-decodable rank-metric code pairs with polynomial-sized lists, based on a recent construction by Guruswami et al, and 3) Obtain new characterizations of security equivalences of linear codes. Finally, we show that our parameters extend relative generalized Hamming weights and relative dimension/length profile, respectively, and relative generalized rank weights and relative dimension/intersection profile, respectively.
given security performance, although using large fields on the network. The field size was later reduced in [15] by reducing the information rate. In addition, the approach in [14] allows us to see secure network coding as a generalization of secret sharing [4] , [37] , which is a generalization of the wire-tap channel of type II [33] .
However, these approaches [6] , [14] , [15] require knowing and/or modifying the underlying linear network code, which does not allow us to perform, for instance, random linear network coding [21] , which achieves capacity in a decentralized manner and is robust to network changes. Later, the use of pairs of linear (block) codes as outer codes was proposed in [39] to protect messages from errors together with information leakage to a wire-tapping adversary (see Remark 4) , depending only on the number of errors and wire-tapped links, respectively, and not depending on the underlying linear network code, which is referred to as universal security in [39] .
In [39] , the encoded message consists of n (number of outgoing links from the source) vectors in F q m or F m q , called packets, where m is called the packet length and where F q is the field used for the underlying linear network code, as opposed to previous works [6] , [14] , [15] , where m = 1. The universal performance of the proposed linear codes in [39] is measured by the rank metric [9] , and the authors in [39] prove that linear codes in F n q m with optimal rank-metric parameters when n ≤ m [17] , [36] are also optimal for universal security. This approach was already proposed in [38] , [40] for error correction, again not depending on the underlying network code. Later the authors in [20] obtained the first list-decodable rank-metric codes whose list sizes are polynomial in the code length and which are able to list-decode universally on linearly coded networks roughly twice as many errors as optimal rank-metric codes [17] , [36] can correct. The rank metric was then generalized in [24] to relative generalized rank weights (RGRWs) and relative dimension/intersection profiles (RDIPs), which were proven in [24] to measure exactly and simultaneously the universal security performance and errorcorrection capability of pairs of linear codes, in the same way as relative generalized Hamming weights (RGHWs) and relative dimension/length profiles (RDLPs) [26] , [42] do on wire-tap channels of type II.
Unfortunately, the codes studied and proposed in [24] , [38] , [39] , [40] for universal security are linear over the extension field F q m . This restricts the possible packet lengths of optimal universal secure codes, requires performing computations over the larger field F q m and leaves out important codes, such as the list-decodable rank-metric codes in [20] , which are only linear over F q .
In this work, we introduce new parameters, called relative generalized matrix weights (RGMWs) and relative dimension/rank support profiles (RDRPs), for codes and code pairs that are linear over the smaller field F q , and prove that they measure their universal security performance in terms of the worst-case information leakage. As main applications, we obtain the first optimal universal secure linear codes on noiseless networks for all possible packet lengths, we obtain the first universal secure list-decodable rank-metric code pairs with polynomial-sized lists, and obtain new characterizations of security equivalences of linear codes.
A. Notation
Let q be a prime power and m and n, two positive integers. We denote by F q the finite field with q elements, which we will consider to be the field used for the underlying linear network code (see [23, Definition 1] ).
Most of our technical results hold for an arbitrary field, which we denote by F and which mathematically plays the role of F q . F n denotes the vector space of row vectors of length n with components in F, and F m×n denotes the vector space of m × n matrices with components in F. Throughout the paper, a (block) code in F m×n (respectively, in F n ) is a subset of F m×n (respectively, of F n ), and it is called linear if it is a vector space over F. In all cases, dimensions of vector spaces over F will be denoted by dim.
Finally, we recall that we may identify F 
where c i = (c i,1 , c i,2 , . . . , c i,n ) ∈ F is an F q -linear vector space isomorphism.
The works [24] , [38] , [39] , [40] consider F q m -linear codes in F n q m , which are a subfamily of F q -linear codes in F m×n q through the map given in (1) . In this paper, we will consider arbitrary linear (meaning F-linear) codes in F m×n .
B. Our motivations
Our main motivation to study universal secure network coding is to avoid knowing and/or modifying the underlying linear network code, and in particular be able to apply our theory on random linearly coded networks [21] , which achieve capacity in a decentralized manner and are robust to network changes.
Our main motivation to study pairs of linear codes is to be able to protect messages simultaneously from errors, erasures and information leakage to a wire-tapper. See also Section II and more concretely, Remark 4.
Our main motivations to study codes which are linear over the base field F q instead of the extension field F q m are the following:
1) F q -linear codes with optimal rank-metric parameters [9] , and thus with optimal universal security and error-correction capability, cannot be F q m -linear for most packet lengths m when m < n. In many applications, packet lengths satisfying m < n are required (see the discussion in [24, Subsection I-A], for instance).
2) The only known list-decodable rank-metric codes [20] with polynomial-sized lists are linear over F q , but not over F q m . Hence the previous studies on universal security cannot be applied on these codes. In particular, no construction of universal secure list-decodable rank-metric coding schemes with polynomial-sized lists are known.
3) In previous works [38] , [39] , [40] , the proposed codes are F q m -linear and m ≥ n. In many cases, this requires performing operations over a very large field, instead of the much smaller field F q .
C. Related works and considered open problems
We consider the following four open problems in the literature, which correspond to the main four contributions listed in the following subsection:
1) Several parameters have been introduced to measure the security performance of linear codes and code pairs on different channels, in terms of the worst-case information leakage. The original RGHWs and RDLPs [26] , [42] measure security performance over wire-tap channels of type II, and relative network generalized Hamming weigths (RNGHWs) [31] , [45] measure security performance over networks depending on the underlying linear network code (non-universal security). Later, RGRWs and RDIPs were introduced in [24] , [32] to measure universal security performance of F q m -linear code pairs C 2 C 1 ⊆ F n q m . A notion of generalized weight for one F q -linear code (that is, for an arbitrary C 1 and for C 2 = {0}) in F m×n q , called Delsarte generalized weights (DGWs), was introduced in [34] , but its connection with universal security was only given for F q m -linear codes. Thus, no measure of universal security performance for all F q -linear codes or code pairs is known. See also Table I. 2) The first optimal universal secure linear codes for noiseless networks were obtained in [39, Section V] , whose information rate attain the information-theoretical limit given in [6] . However, these codes only exist when m ≥ n. The cartesian products in [39, Subsection VII-C] are also optimal among F q -linear codes (see Remark 22) , but only exist when m divides n. No optimal universal secure F q -linear codes for noiseless networks have been obtained for the rest of values of m. See also Table II for an overview of existing optimal constructions, including non-universal codes [6] , [14] , [15] .
3) In [20] , the authors introduce the first list-decodable rank-metric codes in F n q m able to list-decode close to the information-theoretical limit and roughly twice as many errors as optimal rank-metric codes [17] , [36] are able to correct, in polynomial time and with polynomial-sized lists (on the length n). However, no universal secure coding schemes with such list-decoding capabilities are known. Observe that listdecoding rank errors implies list-decoding errors in linear network coding in a universal manner [38] .
4) Several characterizations of maps between vector spaces of matrices preserving certain properties have been given in , Fq-linear Universal security on networks [24] , [32] RGRW & RDIP
, Fq-linear Universal security on networks for F q m -linear [26] , [42] RGHW & RDLP C 2 C 1 ⊆ F n q , Fq-linear Security on wire-tap channels II [31] , [45] RNGHW C 2 C 1 ⊆ F n q , Fq-linear Non-universal security on networks Yes Any m ≥ n or n = lm [6] No 
Universal security on networks [28] φ :
Ranks & universal security on networks [3] φ : [30] φ : F m×n −→ F m×n F-linear Ranks, determinants & eigenvalues [10] φ : F n×n −→ F n×n F-linear Invertible matrices the literature [3] , [10] , [27] , [28] , [30] . The maps considered in [3] are linear over the extension field F q m and preserve ranks, and the maps considered in [10] , [27] , [30] are linear over the base field (F q or an arbitrary field) and preserve fundamental properties of matrices, such as ranks, determinants, eigenvalues or invertible matrices. Characterizations of maps preserving universal security performance were first given in [28] , although the considered maps were only linear over F q m . No characterizations of general F q -linear maps preserving universal security are known. See also Table III .
D. Our contributions and main results
In the following, we list our four main contributions together with our main result summarizing each of them. Each contribution tackles each open problem listed in the previous subsection, respectively. 1) We introduce new parameters, RGMWs and RDRPs, in Definitions 10 and 11, respectively, which measure the universal security performance of F q -linear code pairs C 2 C 1 ⊆ F m×n q , in terms of the worst-case information leakage. The main result is Theorem 1 and states the following: The r-th RGMW of the code pair is the minimum number of links that an adversary needs to wire-tap in order to obtain at least r bits of information (multiplied by log 2 (q)) about the sent message. The µ-th RDRP of the code pair is the maximum number of bits of information (multiplied by log 2 (q)) about the sent message that can be obtained by wire-tapping µ links of the network.
Since F q m -linear codes in F n q m are also F q -linear codes in F m×n q , RGMWs and RDRPs must coincide with RGRWs and RDIPs [24] , respectively, for F q m -linear codes in F n q m , which we prove in Theorem 7.
When C 2 = {0} and m = n, we will also show in Theorem 9 that the RGMWs of the pair coincide with their DGWs, given in [34] , hence proving the connection between DGWs and universal security for general F q -linear codes, which was left open.
2) We obtain optimal universal secure F q -linear codes for noiseless networks for any value of m and n, not only when m ≥ n or m divides n, as in previous works [39] . The main result is Theorem 2, which states the following: Denote by ℓ the number of packets in F m q that the source can transmit and by t the number of links the adversary may wire-tap without obtaining any information about the sent packets. For any m and n, and a fixed value of ℓ (respectively t), we obtain a coding scheme with optimal value of t (respectively ℓ).
3) We obtain the first universal secure list-decodable rankmetric code pairs with polynomial-sized lists. The main result is Theorem 3, and states the following: Defining ℓ and t as in the previous item, assuming that n divides m, and fixing 1 ≤ k 2 < k 2 ≤ n, ε > 0 and a positive integer s such that 4sn ≤ εm and m/n = O(s/ε), we obtain an F q -linear code pair such that ℓ ≥ m(k 1 − k 2 )(1 − 2ε), t ≥ k 2 and which can list-decode 
4)
We obtain characterizations of vector space isomorphisms between certain spaces of matrices over F q that preserve universal security performance over networks. The main result is Theorem 4, which gives several characterizations of F qlinear vector space isomorphisms φ : V −→ W, where V and W are rank support spaces in F m×n q and F m×n ′ q (see Definition 7), respectively.
As application, we obtain in Subsection VI-B ranges of possible parameters m and n that given linear codes and code pairs can be applied to without changing their universal security performance.
E. Organization of the paper
First, all of our main results are stated as Theorems. After some preliminaries in Section II, we introduce in Section III the new parameters of linear code pairs (RGMWs and RDRPs), give their connection with the rank metric, and prove that they exactly measure the worst-case information leakage universally on networks (Theorem 1). In Section IV, we give optimal universal secure linear codes for noiseless networks for all possible parameters (Theorem 2). In Section V, we show how to add universal security to the list-decodable rankmetric codes in [20] (Theorem 3). In Section VI, we define and give characterizations of security equivalences of linear codes (Theorem 4), and then obtain ranges of possible parameters of linear codes up to these equivalences. In Section VII, we give upper and lower Singleton-type bounds (Theorems 5 and 6) and study when they can be attained, when the dimensions are divisible by m. Finally, in Section VIII, we prove that RGMWs extend RGRWs [24] and RGHWs [26] , [42] , and we prove that RDRPs extend RDIPs [24] and RDLPs [16] , [26] (Theorems 7 and 8, respectively). We conclude the section by showing that GMWs coincide with DGWs [34] for non-square matrices, and are strictly larger otherwise (Theorem 9).
II. COSET CODING SCHEMES FOR UNIVERSAL SECURITY IN LINEAR NETWORK CODING
This section serves as a brief summary of the model of linear network coding that we consider (Subsection II-A), the concept of universal security under this model (Subsection II-B) and the main definitions concerning coset coding schemes used for this purpose (Subsection II-C). The section only contains definitions and facts known in the literature, which will be used throughout the paper.
A. Linear network coding model
Consider a network with several sources and several sinks. A given source transmits a message x ∈ F ℓ q through the network to multiple sinks. To that end, that source encodes the message as a collection of n packets of length m, seen as a matrix C ∈ F m×n q , where n is the number of outgoing links from this source. We consider linear network coding on the network, first considered in [1] , [25] and formally defined in [23, Definition 1] , which allows us to reach higher throughput than just storing and forwarding on the network. This means that a given sink receives a matrix of the form
is called the transfer matrix corresponding to the considered source and sink, and A T denotes its transpose. This matrix may be randomly chosen if random linear network coding is applied [21] .
B. Universal secure communication over networks
In secure and reliable network coding, two of the main problems addressed in the literature are the following: 1) Error and erasure correction [5] , [24] , [38] , [39] , [40] : An adversary and/or a noisy channel may introduce errors on some links of the network and/or modify the transfer matrix. In this case, the sink receives the matrix
is the modified transfer matrix, and E ∈ F m×N q is the final error matrix. In this case, we say that t = Rk(E) errors and ρ = n − Rk(A ′ ) erasures occurred, where Rk denotes the rank of a matrix. 2) Information leakage [6] , [14] , [15] , [24] , [39] : A wiretapping adversary listens to µ > 0 links of the network, obtaining a matrix of the form CB T ∈ F m×µ q , for some matrix B ∈ F µ×n q . Outer coding in the source node is usually applied to tackle the previous problems, and it is called universal secure [39] if it provides reliability and security as in the previous items for fixed numbers of wire-tapped links µ, errors t and erasures ρ, independently of the transfer matrix A used. This implies that no previous knowledge or modification of the transfer matrix is required and random linear network coding [21] may be applied.
C. Coset coding schemes for outer codes
Coding techniques for protecting messages simultaneously from errors and information leakage to a wire-tapping adversary were first studied by Wyner in [43] . In [43, p. 1374] , the general concept of coset coding scheme, as we will next define, was first introduced for this purpose. We use the formal definition in [24, Definition 7] : Definition 1 (Coset coding schemes [24] , [43] ). A coset coding scheme over the field F with message set S is a family of disjoint nonempty subsets of F m×n , P S = {C x } x∈S . If F = F q , each x ∈ S is encoded by the source by choosing uniformly at random an element C ∈ C x . Definition 2 (Linear coset coding schemes [28, Definition 2]). A coset coding scheme as in the previous definition is said to be linear if S = F ℓ , for some 0 < ℓ ≤ mn, and
for all a, b ∈ F and all x, y ∈ F ℓ .
With these definitions, the concept of coset coding scheme generalizes the concept of (block) code, since a code is a coset coding scheme where |C x | = 1, for each x ∈ S. In the same way, linear coset coding schemes generalize linear (block) codes.
An equivalent way to describe linear coset coding schemes is by nested linear code pairs, introduced in [44, Section III.A]. We use the description in [7, Subsection 4.2] .
Definition 3 (Nested linear code pairs [7] , [44] ). A nested linear code pair is a pair of linear codes
Choose a vector space W such that C 1 = C 2 ⊕ W, where ⊕ denotes the direct sum of vector spaces, and a vector space isomorphism ψ :
ℓ . They form a linear coset coding scheme called nested coset coding scheme [24] . [33] We recall here that the concept of linear coset coding schemes and nested coset coding schemes are exactly the same. An object in the first family uniquely defines an object in the second family and vice-versa. This is formally proven in [28, Proposition 1] .
Remark 4. As observed in
Finally, we recall that the exact universal error and erasure correction capability of a nested coset coding scheme was found, in terms of the rank metric, first in [38, Section IV.C] for the case of one code (C 2 = {0}) that is maximum rank distance, then in [39, Theorem 2] for the general case of one linear code (again C 2 = {0}), then in [24, Theorem 4] for the case where both codes are linear over an extension field F q m , and finally in [28, Theorem 9] for arbitrary coset coding schemes (linear over F q and non-linear).
III. NEW PARAMETERS OF LINEAR COSET CODING SCHEMES FOR UNIVERSAL SECURITY ON NETWORKS
This is the main section of the paper, which serves as a basis for the rest of sections. The next sections can be read independently of each other, but all of them build on the results in this section. Here we introduce rank support spaces (Subsection III-A), which are the main technical building blocks of our theory, then we define of our main parameters and connect them with the rank metric (Subsection III-B), and we conclude by showing (Theorem 1) that these parameters measure the worst-case information leakage universally on linearly coded networks (Subsection III-C).
A. Rank supports and rank support spaces
In this subsection, we introduce rank support spaces, which are the mathematical building blocks of our theory. The idea is to attach to each linear code its rank support, given in [22, Definition 1] , and based on this rank support, define a vector space of matrices containing the original code that can be seen as its ambient space with respect to the rank metric.
We remark here that the family of rank support spaces can be seen as the family of vector spaces in [35, Notation 25] after transposition of matrices, or the family of vector spaces in [22, Definition 6] taking C = F m×n q
. We start with the definitions:
Definition 5 (Row space and rank). For a matrix C ∈ F m×n , we define its row space Row(C) as the vector space in F n generated by its rows. As usual, we define its rank as Rk(C) = dim(Row(C)).
Definition 6 (Rank support and rank weight [22, Definition 1] ). Given a vector space C ⊆ F m×n , we define its rank support as
We also define the rank weight of the space C as
Observe that RSupp( {C} ) = Row(C) and wt R ( {C} ) = Rk(C), for every matrix C ∈ F m×n , where A denotes the vector space generated by a set A over F.
We denote by RS(F m×n ) the family of rank support spaces in F m×n .
The following lemma shows that rank support spaces behave as a sort of ambient spaces for linear codes and can be attached bijectively to vector spaces in F n , which correspond to the rank supports of the original linear codes. 
m×n is a vector space and L = RSupp(C), then V L is the smallest rank support space containing C.
We conclude the subsection with the following characterizations of rank support spaces, which we will use throughout the paper. In particular, item 2 will be useful to prove Theorem 4, and item 3 will be useful to prove Theorem 1. 
In addition, the relation between items 1, 2 and 3 is that
Proof. We prove the following implications:
. . , b k be a basis of L, and let B i,j be as in item 2. Then we see that
• 1 ⇐⇒ 3: Assume item 1 and let B ∈ F µ×n be a parity check matrix of L. That is, a generator matrix of the dual L ⊥ ⊆ F n . Then it holds by definition that V ∈ F m×n has all its rows in L if, and only if, V B T = 0. Conversely, assuming item 3 and defining L as the code with parity check matrix B, we see that V = V L by the same argument. Hence the result follows.
B. Definition and basic properties of the new parameters
, we define their r-th relative generalized matrix weight (RGMW) as
For a linear code C ⊆ F m×n , and 1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C), we define its r-th generalized matrix weight (GMW) as
Observe that it holds that
for all nested linear codes C 2 C 1 ⊆ F m×n , and all 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ = dim(C 1 /C 2 ).
Definition 11 (Relative Dimension/Rank support Profile).
Given nested linear codes C 2 C 1 ⊆ F m×n , and 0 ≤ µ ≤ n, we define their µ-th relative dimension/rank support profile (RDRP) as
Now, if U ⊆ V ⊆ F m×n are vector spaces, the natural linear map C 1 ∩U/C 2 ∩U −→ C 1 ∩V/C 2 ∩V is one to one. Therefore, since we are taking maximums, it holds that
We remark here that some existing notions of relative generalized weights from the literature are particular cases of RGMWs. The corresponding connections are given in Section VIII. In particular, GMWs of one linear code coincide with DGWs (introduced in [34] ) for non-square matrices.
We next obtain the following characterization of RGMWs that gives an analogous description to the original definition of GHWs by Wei [42] :
Proof. Denote by d r the number on the left-hand side and by d ′ r the number on the right-hand side. We prove both inequalities:
There exists a vector space
Thanks to this characterization, we may connect RGMWs with the rank distance [9] . This will be crucial in the next section, where we will use maximum rank distance codes from [9] to obtain optimal universal secure linear codes for noiseless networks. Recall the definition of minimum rank distance of a linear coset coding scheme, which is a particular case of [28, Equation (1)], and which is based on the analogous concept for the Hamming metric given in [13] :
The following result follows from the previous theorem and the definitions:
By Theorem 9, the previous corollary coincides with item 1 in [34, Theorem 30] when C 2 = {0} and m = n.
We conclude by showing the connection between RDRPs and RGMWs:
Proposition 14 (Connection between RDRPs and RGMWs). Given nested linear codes
C 2 C 1 ⊆ F m×n and 1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C 1 /C 2 ), it holds that d M,r (C 1 , C 2 ) = min{µ | K M,µ (C 1 , C 2 ) ≥ r}.
Proof. It is proven as [24, Proof of Lemma 4].

C. Measuring information leakage on networks
In this subsection, we show how the introduced parameters (RGMWs and RDRPs) measure the universal security performance of nested linear code pairs.
Assume that a given source wants to convey the message x ∈ F ℓ q , which we assume is a random variable with uniform distribution over F ℓ q . Following Subsection II-C, the source encodes x into a matrix C ∈ F m×n q using nested linear codes
. We also assume that the distributions used in the encoding are all uniform (see Subsection II-C).
According to the information leakage model in Subsection II-B, item 2, a wire-tapping adversary obtains CB T ∈ F m×µ q , for some matrix B ∈ F µ×n q . Recall from [8] the definition of mutual information of two random variables X and Y :
where H(Y ) denotes the entropy of Y and H(Y | X) denotes the conditional entropy of Y given X, and where we take logarithms with base q (see [8] for more details).
We will need to use the concept of duality with respect to the Hilbert-Schmidt or trace product. In Appendix A, we collect some basic properties of duality of linear codes. We now give the main definitions: Definition 15 (Hilbert-Schmidt or trace product). Given matrices C, D ∈ F m×n , we define its Hilbert-Schmidt product, or trace product, as
where c i and d i are the rows of C and D, respectively, and where c i,j and d i,j are their components, respectively. Given a vector space C ⊆ F m×n , we denote by C ⊥ its dual:
We first compute the mutual information of the message and the wire-tapper's observation via rank support spaces:
, and the uniform random variables x and CB T , as in the beginning of this subsection, it holds that
where I(x; CB T ) is as in (6) , and where L = Row(B).
Proof. Define the map f :
given by
for the matrix B ∈ F µ×n q . Observe that f is a linear map. It follows that
where the last equality is the well-known first isomorphism theorem. On the other hand, we may similarly compute the conditional entropy:
However, it holds that
by Proposition 9, since B is a parity check matrix of L ⊥ . Therefore
Finally, the result follows by Lemmas 63 and 64 in Appendix A.
The following theorem follows from the previous proposition, Corollary 13 and the definitions:
, and integers 0 ≤ µ ≤ n and
is the minimum number of links that an adversary needs to wire-tap in order to obtain at least r units of information (number of bits multiplied by log 2 (q)) of the sent message.
is the maximum information (number of bits multiplied by log 2 (q)) about the sent message that can be obtained by wire-tapping at most µ links of the network. 
IV. OPTIMAL UNIVERSAL SECURE LINEAR CODES FOR NOISELESS NETWORKS AND ANY PACKET LENGTH
In this section, we obtain linear coset coding schemes built from nested linear code pairs C F m×n , which in this section will refer to those with C 2 = C and C 1 = F m×n , with optimal universal security performance in the case of finite fields F = F q (Theorem 2). Recall from Subsection II-C that these linear coset coding schemes are suitable for noiseless networks, as noticed in [33] (see also Remark 4) .
In this section, we consider perfect universal secrecy (the adversary obtains no information after wire-tapping a given number of links), thus we make use of the theory in last section concerning the first RGMW. In Section VII, we will consider bounds on the rest of RGMWs, for general code pairs (suitable for noisy networks), and their achievability. Definition 19. For a nested linear code pair of the form C F m×n q , we define its information parameter as
, that is the maximum number of log 2 (q) bits of information that the source can convey, and its security parameter t as the maximum number of links that an adversary may listen to without obtaining any information about the sent message.
Due to Theorem 1, it holds that t = d R (C ⊥ ) − 1. We study two problems: 1) Find a nested linear code pair C F m×n q
with maximum possible security parameter t when m, n, q and the information parameter ℓ are fixed and given. 2) Find a nested linear code pair C F m×n q with maximum possible information parameter ℓ when m, n, q and the security parameter t are fixed and given. We will deduce bounds on these parameters from the Singleton bound on the dimension of rank-metric codes [ 
As usual in the literature, we say that C is maximum rank distance (MRD) if equality holds in (8) .
Thanks to Theorem 1 and the previous lemma, we may give upper bounds on the attainable parameters in the previous two problems:
Proposition 21. Given a nested linear code pair C F m×n q with information parameter ℓ and security parameter t, it holds that:
In particular, ℓ ≤ mn and t ≤ min{m, n}.
Hence the result follows from the bound (8) for C ⊥ .
On the other hand, the existence of linear codes in F [39, Theorem 7] .
Using cartesian products of MRD codes as in [39, 
V. UNIVERSAL SECURE LIST-DECODABLE RANK-METRIC LINEAR COSET CODING SCHEMES
In this section, we will obtain nested linear code pairs C 2 C 1 ⊆ F m×n q when n divides m that can list-decode rank errors on noisy networks (as opposed to the scenario in last section), whose list sizes are polynomial on the code length n, while being univeral secure under a given number of wire-tapped links. As in last section, we consider perfect universal secrecy, and thus make use of the results in Section III concerning the first RGMW of the dual code pair.
We give the construction in Subsection V-A, together with its parameters (Theorem 3): information parameter ℓ, security parameter t and number of list-decodable rank errors e. To measure the quality of the proposed code pair, we will compare in Subsection V-B their parameters with those obtained when choosing C 1 and C 2 as MRD codes [17] , [36] , which provide coset coding schemes with both optimal universal security and optimal error-correction capability [39] . We will also show (Subsection V-C) the near optimality of the obtained construction in terms of the introduced uncertainty on the secret message and the number of list-decodable rank errors.
A. The construction and its main properties
We start by extending the definition of rank list-decodable codes from [11, Definition 2] to coset coding schemes:
Definition 23. For positive integers e and L, we say that a coset coding scheme
, we have that
where B(Y, e) denotes the ball in F m×n q with center Y and rank radius e. The number of list-decodable rank errors is e and the list sizes are said to be polynomial in n if L = O(F (n)), for some polynomial F (x). We now give the above mentioned construction, which exists whenever n divides m. The main objective is to obtain simultaneously large information parameter ℓ, security parameter t and number of list-decodable rank errors e. Construction 1. Assume that n divides m and fix ε > 0 and positive integers s and 1 ≤ k 2 < k 1 ≤ n such that 4sn ≤ εm and m/n = O(s/ε). In the next subsection, mk 1 and mk 2 will be the dimensions of the MRD linear codes constituting an optimal universal secure nested coset coding scheme, but here they are just fixed parameters.
Fix a basis α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α m of F q m as a vector space over F q , such that α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n generate F q n (recall that F q n ⊆ F q m since n divides m).
Recall that a q-linearized polynomial over F q m is a polynomial of the form
q m , and finally define the linear codes
where M α is the map given in (1) and H 0 , H 1 , . . . , H k1−k2−1 ⊆ F q m are the F q -linear vector spaces described in [20, Theorem 8] . We recall this description in Appendix B. Observe that these vector spaces depend on ε and s.
Let
form a coset coding scheme as in Definition 3. Define the vector space
which satisfies that C 1 = C 2 ⊕ W. Now consider the secret space as H 0 ×H 1 ×· · ·×H k1−k2−1 ∼ = F ℓ q , and define the vector space isomorphism ψ :
We may now state the main result of this section:
With the same assumptions and notation, the nested coset coding scheme in Construction 1 satisfies that:
2 ) , and it admits a list-decoding algorithm that obtains all corresponding uncoded messages with polynomial complexity in n.
We devote the rest of the subsection to prove this theorem. We need to recall some definitions and results from [20] : 
with dimensions taken over F q , for every F q n -linear subspace V ⊆ F q m of dimension at most r over F q n .
The following lemma is part of [20 We may now prove our main result:
Proof of Theorem 3. We prove each item separately:
1) By Lemma 69 in Appendix B, it holds that dim(
2) By Theorem 1, the security parameter is
Since C 2 is MRD, then so is its trace dual [9] , which means that d R (C ⊥ 2 ) = k 2 + 1, and the result follows.
3) As shown in [20, Subsection IV-B], we may perform list-decoding for the Gabidulin code G 1 ⊇ C 1 ,
. . H k1−k2−1 form an (s, 2(m/n − 1)s/ε, n) F q -linear subspace design by Lemma 26, such intersection is an F q -linear affine space of dimension at most O(s 2 /ε 2 ) (recall that m/n = O(s/ε)) by the definition of subspace designs and periodic subspaces.
B. Comparison with optimal unique-decodable linear coset coding schemes based on MRD codes
In this subsection, we compare the schemes in Construction 1 with those obtained when using MRD codes [17] , [36] , whose information parameter ℓ is optimal for given security parameter t and number of unique-decodable rank errors e, due to Theorems 11 and 12 in [39] . Therefore, assuming that n divides m and given MRD linear codes
of dimensions dim(C 1 ) = mk 1 and dim(C 2 ) = mk 2 , the linear coset coding scheme in Construction 1 has at least the same security parameter t as that obtained using C 1 and C 2 , an information parameter ℓ that is at least 1 − 2ε times the one obtained using C 1 and C 2 , and can list-decode in polynomial time (with list of polynomial size) roughly n − k 1 errors, which is twice as many as the rank errors that C 1 and C 2 can correct, due to the previous proposition and Theorem 3.
C. Near optimality of the obtained construction
In this subsection, we will show the near optimality of Construction 1 in terms of its introduced uncertainty H(C|x) compared to the maximum observed information H(CB T ) by the wire-tapper, and the number of rank errors e that the scheme can list-decode.
Let x ∈ F ℓ q and C ∈ F m×n q denote the random variables representing the secret message and the transmitted codeword, respectively, as in Subsection III-C.
The quantity H(C|x) measures the amount of randomness of C given x introduced by the corresponding coset coding scheme, and we would like it to be as small as possible since generating randomness is difficult in practice. Observe that H(C|x) = dim(C 2 ) for nested coset coding schemes. On the other hand, the quantity H(CB T ) measures the amount of observed information by wire-tapping µ links if B ∈ F µ×n q , which satisfies H(CB T ) ≤ mµ, being the inequality usually tight when I(x; CB T ) = 0 or even an equality, as is the case for Gabidulin codes. Thus the following bound is a weaker version of a bound of the form mt ≤ dim(C 2 ), which we leave as open problem. . The result follows from the following chain of inequalities:
Now consider the coset coding scheme in Construction 1, and fix µ ≤ k 2 ≤ k 1 . Define the Gabidulin code
, and let G be the uniform random variable on G 1 . It holds that
since µ ≤ k 1 . Equation (11) together with dim(
Using that H(C|x) = dim(C 2 ) = mk 2 , we see that the bound in the previous proposition is tight for Construction 1:
Next we show that the rank list-decoding capability cannot be improved for large s and small ε, compared to general nested coset coding schemes. Since rank list-decodable nested coset coding schemes still require decoding each coset, we will consider those such that a complementary space W as in Definition 3 is rank list-decodable with polynomial-sized lists after adding an error matrix from the smaller code C 2 :
and a subspace W ⊆ C 1 such that C 1 = C 2 ⊕ W, and denote by M the maximum rank of a matrix in
On the other hand, the maximum rank of codewords in C 2 is at least dim(C 2 )/m by [35, Proposition 47] . Hence
and we are done.
For the nested coset coding scheme in Construction 1, it holds that e = s s + 1 (n − k 1 ), and
which are closer as s becomes larger and ε becomes smaller.
VI. SECURITY EQUIVALENCES OF LINEAR COSET CODING SCHEMES AND MINIMUM PARAMETERS
In this section, we study when two nested linear code pairs
′ have the same universal security and/or reliability performance. First, we define security equivalences and give several characterizations of these in Theorem 4 (Subsection VI-A), which show that they also preserve error and erasure correction capabilities. As applications, we study ranges and minimum possible parameters m and n for linear codes (Subsection VI-B), and we study when they are degenerate (Subsection VI-C), meaning when they can be applied to networks with strictly smaller length n.
A. Security equivalences and rank isometries
In this subsection, we first give in Theorem 4 the above mentioned characterizations, and we define afterwards security equivalences as maps satisfying one of such characterizations. We continue with Proposition 36, which shows that security equivalences actually preserve universal security performance as in Subsection II-B, thus motivating our definition. We conclude by comparing Theorem 4 with related results from the literature (see also Table III) .
Due to the importance of the rank metric for error and erasure correction in linear network coding (see Subsection II-B), and for universal security (by Theorem 1 and Corollary 13), we start by considering rank isometries:
Definition 31 (Rank isometries). We say that a map φ : V −→ W between vector spaces V ⊆ F m×n and W ⊆ F m ′ ×n ′ is a rank isometry if it is a vector space isomorphism and Rk(φ(V )) = Rk(V ), for all V ∈ V. In that case, we say that V and W are rank isometric.
We have the following result, which was first proven in [27, Theorem 1] for square matrices and the complex field F = C. In [30, Proposition 3] it is observed that the square condition is not necessary and it may be proven for arbitrary fields: [30] ). If φ : F m×n −→ F m×n is a rank isometry, then there exist invertible matrices A ∈ F m×m and B ∈ F n×n such that
where the latter case can only happen if m = n.
We will define security equivalences as certain vector space isomorphisms satisfying one of several equivalent conditions. We first show their equivalence in the following theorem, which is the main result of this section: 
(P 3) For all subspaces D ⊆ V, it holds that wt R (φ(D)) = wt R (D). (P 4) φ is a rank isometry.
Then the following implications hold:
In particular, a security equivalence is a rank isometry and, in the case V = W = F m×n and m = n, the reversed implication holds by Proposition 32.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 33. Unfortunately, the implication (P 3) ⇐= (P 4) does not always hold. Take for instance m = n and the map φ :
Remark 34. Observe that, in particular, security equivalences also preserve (relative) generalized matrix weights, (relative) dimension/rank support profiles and distributions of rank weights of vector subspaces, and they are the only rank isometries with these properties.
Property (P 1) will be useful for technical computations and, in particular, for Proposition 36 below. As explained in Appendix C, (P 2) allows us to connect (P 1) with (P 3), and (P 3) allows us to connect the first two with the rank metric (P 4), crucial for error and erasure correction as in Subsection II-B. Finally, Property (P 2) also explains why we will consider security equivalences defined between rank support spaces, and intuitively explains that such spaces behave as ambient spaces in our theory, as mentioned in Subsection III-A.
Definition 35 (Security equivalences).
We say that a map φ : V −→ W between rank support spaces V ∈ RS(F m×n ) and W ∈ RS(F m×n ′ ) is a security equivalence if it is a vector space isomorphism and satisfies condition (P 1), (P 2) or (P 3) in Theorem 4.
Two nested linear code pairs C 2 C 1 ⊆ F m×n and C We now motivate the previous definition with the next proposition, which makes use of Theorem 4. Observe that Remark 34 above already shows that security equivalences preserve the worst-case information leakage as described in Theorem 1. Now, given nested linear code pairs C 2
, Proposition 36 below shows that if the dual pairs are security equivalent, then there exists a bijective correspondence between wire-tappers' transfer matrices (matrix B in Subsection II-B, item 2) that preserves the mutual information with the original sent message. If the original pairs are also security equivalent, we conclude that encoding with
yields exactly the same universal error and erasure correction performance, and exactly the same universal security performance over linearly coded networks, as in Subsection II-B. Furthermore, assuming n ≤ n ′ , the correspondence M → M B is one to one and, for any matrix
, it holds that
Proof. Denote by φ the security equivalence. Take a matrix
and similarly for C 2 . Thus Equation (12) follows from Proposition 16 .
Observe that we may assume n ≤ n ′ without loss of generality, since the inverse of a security equivalence is a security equivalence. Thus the injectivity of M → M B follows from the fact that B has full rank.
, the last statement follows again from Proposition 16.
The topic of vector space isomorphisms φ : F m×n −→ F m×n preserving some specified property has been intensively studied in the literature (see also Table III) , where the term Frobenius map is generally used for maps of the form of those in Proposition 32.
When m = n, it is proven in [10, Theorem 3] that Frobenius maps are characterized by being those preserving invertible matrices and in [27] they are characterized by being those preserving ranks (this is extended to m = n in [30, Proposition 3]), those preserving determinants and those preserving eigenvalues.
On the other hand, [3, Theorem 1] shows that F q m -linear vector space isomorphisms φ : F n q m −→ F n q m preserving ranks are given by φ(c) = βcA, for β ∈ F q m \ {0} and an invertible A ∈ F n×n q . This is extended in [28, Theorem 5 ] to F q m -linear vector space isomorphisms whose domain and codomain are F q m -linear Galois closed spaces in F n q m , which correspond to rank support spaces in F m×n q (see Lemma 52 below). Therefore, we extend these works in three directions simultaneously: First, we consider the stronger properties (P 1), (P 2) and (P 3) than those considered in [3] , [10] , [27] , [30] , which are essentially (P 4). Second, we extend the domains and codomains from F m×n to general rank support spaces whose matrices do not necessarily have the same sizes. Finally, in the case F = F q , we consider general F q -linear maps, instead of the particular case of F q m -linear maps as in [3] , [28] .
B. Minimum parameters of linear codes
As main application of the previous subsection, we study in this subsection the minimum parameters m and n for which there exists a linear code that is security equivalent to a given one. Recall from Subsection II-A that m corresponds to the packet length used in the network, and n corresponds to the number of outgoing links from the source.
Both cases of one linear code, that is C 2 = {0} and C 1 = F m×n , are covered since they are dual of each other (see also Remark 4 and Appendix A). Since security equivalences are rank isometries by Theorem 4, in the first case we find minimum parameters for error and erasure correction, and in the second case we find minimum parameters for universal security on noiseless linearly coded networks. 
is a vector space isomorphism. By dimensions, we just need to see that it is onto. Take W ∈ F m×d . It holds that W = W I = W AA ′ = φ(W A), and W A ∈ V L by definition.
On the other hand, φ is a security equivalence by Theorem 4. Therefore φ(C) ⊆ F m×d is security equivalent to C. Finally, we see that appending n ′ − d zero columns to the matrices in φ(C) gives a security equivalent code to C in F m×n ′ .
By transposing matrices, we obtain the following consequence, where we consider linear codes that are rank isometric to a given one. By [28, Theorem 9] , such equivalent codes perform equally when used for error and erasure correction, and by Theorem 1 and Corollary 13, they perform equally regarding the maximum number of links that an adversary may wire-tap without obtaining any information on noiseless networks.
Corollary 38. For a linear code C ⊆ F
m×n , define the transposed linear code
Proof. It follows from Theorem 4 and Proposition 37.
As a related result, [28, Proposition 3] computes the minimum parameter n for which there exists an F q m -linear code C ⊆ F n q m that is rank isometric to a given one. In contrast, we consider both parameters m and n, we consider security equivalences for the parameter n, and not only rank isometries, and as the biggest difference with [28] , we consider general linear codes, and not only F q m -linear codes in F n q m .
C. Degenerate codes
In this subsection, we study degenerate codes, which by the study in the previous subsection, can be applied to networks with less outgoing links or, by transposing matrices, with smaller packet length. Degenerateness of codes in the rank metric has been studied in [22, Section 6] and [28, Subsection IV-B], but only for F q m -linear codes in F n q m . We extend those studies to general linear codes in F m×n .
Definition 39 (Degenerate codes). We say that a linear code C ⊆ F m×n is degenerate if it is security equivalent to a linear code
The following lemma follows from Proposition 37:
Now we may give characterizations in terms of the minimum rank distance of the dual code thanks to Proposition 65 in Appendix A.
Proposition 41. Given a linear code C ⊆ F
m×n , the following hold:
Proof. From Proposition 65, we know that
where the sets on the left-hand side are disjoint, and where k = dim(C). Now, the smallest number in
, and the smallest number in
. Item 1 follows from this and the previous lemma. Item 2 follows from item 1 and Proposition 43 in Subsection VII-A.
VII. MONOTONICITY AND SINGLETON-TYPE BOUNDS
In this section, we give upper and lower Singleton-type bounds on RGMWs. We start with the monotonicity of RDRPs and RGMWs (Subsection VII-A), which have their own interest, but which are a crucial tool to prove the main bounds (Theorems 5 and 6 in Subsection VII-B). Finally we study linear codes C ⊆ F m×n , meaning C 1 = C and C 2 = {0}, that attain these bounds and whose dimensions are divisible by m (Subsection VII-C).
A. Monotonicity of RGMWs and RDRPs
The monotonicity bounds presented in this subsection are crucial tools for Theorems 5 and 6, but they also have an interpretation in terms of the worst-case information leakage, due to Theorem 1: An adversary wire-tapping more links in the network will obtain more information in the worst case, and to obtain more information than the worst case for a given number of links, the adversary needs to wire-tap more links. We also bound the corresponding differences.
Proposition 42 (Monotonicity of RDRPs). Given nested linear codes
Proof. The only property that is not trivial from the definitions is
Using (2), a simple computation shows that
and the result follows. 
Proposition 43 (Monotonicity of RGMWs). Given nested linear codes
The last inequality follows from Proposition 14 and Proposition 42.
Due to Theorem 9, the first and third inequalities in the previous proposition coincide with items 3 and 4 in [34, Theorem 30] when C 2 = {0} and m = n.
B. Upper and lower Singleton-type bounds
Due to Theorem 1, it is desirable to obtain nested linear code pairs with large RGMWs. The following result gives a fundamental upper bound on them, whose achievability for one linear code (C 2 = {0}) is studied in the next subsection.
Theorem 5 (Upper Singleton-type bound). Given nested linear codes
In particular, it follows that
which extends (8) to nested linear code pairs.
Proof. First of all, we have that d M,ℓ (C 1 , C 2 ) ≤ n by definition. Therefore the case r = ℓ follows.
For the general case, we will prove that md M,r (C 1
where the last inequality follows from md M,ℓ (C 1 , C 2 ) ≤ mn and r + (h + 1)m − 1 ≥ ℓ.
Finally, the last bound is obtained by setting r = 1 and using Corollary 13 for the given nested linear code pair and the pair obtained by transposing matrices.
Due to Theorem 9, the previous theorem coincides with item 5 in [34, Theorem 30] when C 2 = {0} and m = n.
Remark 44. In view of [24, Proposition 1] or [26, Equation (24)], it is natural to wonder whether a sharper bound of the form
holds. However, this is not the case in general, as the following example shows.
Example 45. Consider m = 2, the canonical basis e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n of F n , and the linear codes C 1 = F 2×n and
Observe that ℓ = dim(C 1 /C 2 ) = n. A bound as in the previous remark would imply that d M,n (C 1 , C 2 ) ≤ ⌈n/2⌉. However, a direct inspection shows that d M,n (C 1 , C 2 ) = n, since all vectors e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n must lie in the row space of any D with
On the other hand, we have the following lower bound:
Proof. Take a subspace D ⊆ F m×n and define L = RSupp(D). We have that D ⊆ V L . Using (2), we see that
The result follows from this and Proposition 12.
Due to Theorem 9, the previous theorem coincides with item 6 in [34, Theorem 30] when C 2 = {0} and m = n.
C. Linear codes attaining the bounds and whose dimensions are divisible by the packet length
In this subsection, we study the achievability of the bounds (13) and (14) for one linear code whose dimension is divisible by the packet length m. As we will show in Subsection VIII-C, DGWs [34] of one linear code coincide with its GMWs when m = n. Thus the two propositions below coincide with Corollaries 31 and 32 in [34] when m = n.
Recall from (8) that, if a linear code is MRD and n ≤ m, then its dimension is divisible by m. In the next proposition, we show that GMWs of MRD linear codes for n ≤ m are all given by m, n and dim(C), and all attain the upper Singletontype bound (13): Proposition 46. Let C ⊆ F m×n be a linear code with dim(C) = mk. The following are equivalent if n ≤ m:
Proof. Item 1 and item 2 are equivalent by definition, and item 3 implies item 2 by choosing r = 1. Now assume item 2 and let 1 ≤ r ≤ mk. Let r = hm + s, with h ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ s < m. We need to distinguish the cases s > 0 and s = 0. We prove only the first case, being the second analogous. By Proposition 43, we have that
On the other hand, ⌈(mk − r + 1)/m⌉ = k − h, and therefore the bound (13) implies that
and hence d M,r (C) = n − k + ⌊(r − 1)/m⌋ + 1 since ⌊(r − 1)/m⌋ = h, and item 3 follows.
Regarding the lower Singleton-type bound, we show in the next proposition that rank support spaces are also characterized by having the minimum possible GMWs in view of (14):
m×n be a linear code with dim(C) = mk. The following are equivalent:
Proof. Assume that C = V L , as in item 1. By taking a sequence of subspaces
Item 3 implies item 2 by taking r = km.
, we see that V L = C and item 1 follows.
VIII. RELATION WITH OTHER EXISTING NOTIONS OF GENERALIZED WEIGHTS
In this section, we study the relation between RGMWs and RDRPs and other notions of generalized weights (see Table  I ). We first show that RGMWs and RDRPs extend RGRWs and RDIPs [24] , [32] (Theorem 7 in Subsection VIII-A), respectively, then we show that they extend RGHWs and RDLPs [16] , [26] , [42] (Theorem 8 in Subsection VIII-B), respectively, and we conclude by showing that GMWs coincide with DGWs [34] for one linear code, meaning C 1 = C arbitrary and C 2 = {0}, when m = n, and are strictly larger when m = n (Theorem 9 in Subsection VIII-C).
A. RGMWs extend relative generalized rank weights
In this subsection, we prove that RGMWs and RDRPs extend RGRWs and RDIPs [24] , [32] , respectively.
Definition 48 (Galois closed spaces [41] ). We say that an
. . , v n ) ∈ V} ⊆ V. We denote by Υ(F n q m ) the family of F q m -linear Galois closed vector spaces in F n q m . RGRWs and RDIPs are then defined in [24] as follows:
, we define their r-th relative generalized rank weight (RGRW) as
where dimensions are taken over F q m .
Definition 50 (Relative Dimension/Intersection Profile [24, Definition 1]). Given nested F q m -linear codes C 2 C 1 ⊆ F n q m , and 0 ≤ µ ≤ n, we define their µ-th relative dimension/intersection profile (RDIP) as
The following is the main result of the subsection, which shows that Theorem 1 extends the study on worst-case information leakage on F q -linearly coded networks in [24] (see its Theorem 2 and Corollary 5) from F q m -linear codes in F n q m to general F q -linear codes in F m×n q , when considering uniform probability distributions.
is as in (1) .
The theorem follows from the next two lemmas, where we take the first one from [41] : 
where dim(V) is taken over F q m and dim(L) over F q .
Proof. We first observe the following. For an arbitrary set V ⊆ F n q m , the previous lemma states that V is an F q m -linear Galois closed vector space if, and only if, V is F q -linear and it has a basis over F q of the form v i,j = α i b j , for i = 1, 2, . . . , m and j = 1, 2, . . . , k, where
, we see that this condition is equivalent to item 2 in Proposition 9, and we are done. [18, Theorem 1] .
Thus the results in this subsection can be applied to generalizations of rank-metric codes such as those in [2] .
B. RGMWs extend relative generalized Hamming weights
In this subsection, we show that RGMWs and RDRPs also extend RGHWs and RDLPs [16] , [26] , [42] , respectively. We start with the definitions of Hamming supports and Hamming support spaces:
Definition 54 (Hamming supports). Given a vector space C ⊆ F n , we define its Hamming support as
We also define the Hamming weight of the space C as
Finally, for a vector c ∈ F n , we define its Hamming support as HSupp(c) = HSupp( {c} ), and its Hamming weight as wt H (c) = wt H ( {c} ).
Definition 55 (Hamming support spaces) . Given a subset I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we define its Hamming support space as the vector space in F n given by
We may now define RGHWs and RDLPs:
Definition 56 (Relative Generalized Hamming Weigths [26, Section III]). Given nested linear codes C 2 C 1 ⊆ F n , and 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ = dim(C 1 /C 2 ), we define their r-th relative generalized Hamming weight (RGHW) as
As in Proposition 12, it holds that
Given a linear code C ⊆ F n , we see that its r-th GHW [42,
Definition 57 (Relative Dimension/Length Profile [16] , [26] ). Given nested linear codes C 2 C 1 ⊆ F n , and 0 ≤ µ ≤ n, we define their µ-th relative dimension/length profile (RDLP) as
To prove our results, we need to see vectors in F n as matrices in F n×n . To that end, we introduce the diagonal matrix representation map ∆ :
where c = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) ∈ F n and δ i,j represents the Kronecker delta. In other words, ∆(c) is the diagonal matrix whose diagonal vector is c.
The map ∆ : F n −→ F n×n is linear, one to one and, for any vector space D ⊆ F n , it holds that
We may now give the main result of this subsection:
Proof. We prove the first equality, being the second analogous.
Denote by d r the number on the left-hand side and by d ′ r the number on the right-hand side, and prove both inequalities:
C. Relation with Delsarte generalized weights
A notion of generalized weights, called Delsarte generalized weights (DGWs), for a linear code, which in this section means C 1 = C arbitrary and C 2 = {0} has already been proposed in [34] as an algebraic invariant of the code. We will prove that GMWs are strictly larger than DGWs when m = n, and we will prove that both coincide in the other cases.
These weights are defined in terms of optimal anticodes for the rank metric:
Definition 58 (Maximum rank distance). For a linear code C ⊆ F m×n , we define its maximum rank distance as
The following bound is given in [35, Proposition 47] :
This leads to the definition of rank-metric optimal anticodes:
Definition 59 (Optimal anticodes [34, Definition 22] ). We say that a linear code V ⊆ F m×n is a (rank-metric) optimal anticode if equality in (16) holds.
We will denote by A(F m×n ) the family of linear optimal anticodes in F m×n .
In view of this, DGWs are defined in [34] as follows:
Definition 60 (Delsarte generalized weights [34, Definition 23] ). For a linear code C ⊆ F m×n and an integer 1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C), we define its r-th Delsarte generalized weight (DGW) as
Observe that d D,r (C) is an integer since the dimension of optimal anticodes is a multiple of m by definition.
Before giving the main result, we need the following proposition:
Proposition 61. If a set V ⊆ F m×n is a rank support space, then it is a (rank-metric) optimal anticode. In other words,
Proof. We first prove that RS(F m×n ) ⊆ A(F m×n ). Let V ∈ RS(F m×n ) and let B i,j , i = 1, 2, . . . , m and j = 1, 2, . . . , k, be a basis of V as in Proposition 9, item 2.
where b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b k are as in Proposition 9, item 2. Therefore dim(V) = mk ≥ mMaxRk(V) and V is an optimal anticode. We now prove that A(F m×n ) ⊆ RS(F m×n ) when m = n. Let V ∈ A(F m×n ). By [34, Theorem 26] , there exist full-rank matrices A ∈ F m×m q and B ∈ F n×n q
n−k for some positive integer k. By Proposition 9, V is a rank support space and we are done.
In [34, Theorem 18] it is proven that V ⊆ F n q m is an F q mlinear Galois closed vector space if, and only if, it is an F q mlinear vector space satisfying equality in (16) . Hence due to Lemma 52, the previous proposition strengthens [34, Theorem 18] when m = n by showing that the F q m -linearity of V may be weakened to F q -linearity. Moreover, our result holds for any field F = F q .
The main result of this subsection is the next theorem, which follows from the previous proposition and the corresponding definitions:
Theorem 9. For a linear code C ⊆ F m×n and an integer 1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C), we have that
Due to Theorem 1, when considering universal security on linearly coded networks it is desirable to obtain linear codes C ⊆ F m×n q with large GMWs. Therefore, linear codes with large DGWs serve this purpose, but linear codes with low DGWs may still have large GMWs when m = n.
The next example shows that not all linear optimal anticodes are rank support spaces when m = n, that is, RS(F n×n ) A(F n×n ), for any n and any field F. As a consequence, in some cases GMWs are strictly larger than DGWs. To that end, we will use the characterization of rank support spaces as matrix modules from Appendix D.
Example 62. Consider m = n = 2 and the linear code
It holds that dim(C) = 2, m = 2 and MaxRk(C) = 1. Therefore C is an optimal anticode. However, it is not a matrix module, and therefore it is not a rank support space (see Appendix D), since On the other hand, it is easy to check that d M,1 (C) = 1, and since
Observe that we may trivially extend this example to any value of m = n, and it holds for an arbitrary field F.
IX. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this work, we have extended the study of universal security provided by F q m -linear nested coset coding schemes from [24] , [39] to that provided by F q -linear schemes, where F q is the field used on the network and m is the packet length.
Thanks to this study, we have completed the list of parameters ℓ, t, m and n for which we can obtain optimal universal secure F q -linear codes for noiseless networks from [39] , and we have added near optimal universal security to the rank list-decodable codes from [20] , providing the first universal secure linear coset coding schemes able to list-decode in polynomial time roughly twice the rank errors that optimal universal secure schemes can unique-decode, with almost the same secret message size ℓ and security parameter t.
Motivated by our study, we defined a family of security equivalences between linear coset coding schemes and gave mathematical characterizations of such equivalences, which allowed us to obtain, in terms of the last generalized matrix weight, ranges of parameters m and n of networks on which a linear code can be applied with the same security performance.
Finally, we give the following list of open problems: 1) Obtain optimal universal secure and error-correcting linear coset coding schemes for noisy networks for all possible parameters ℓ, t, m, n, and number of rank errors.
2) Extend the concept of universal strong security from [24, Definition 6] to general F q -linear coset coding schemes, and provide optimal universal strong secure schemes as those in [24, Section V] for all possible parameters ℓ, t, m and n, for either noiseless or noisy networks.
3) Subsection V-C implies that ℓ is close to but smaller than n − t − e, where e is the number of list-decodable rank errors with polynomial list sizes L. We conjecture, but leave as open problem, that a bound similar to ℓ ≤ n−t−e holds in general.
4) Study the sharpness of the bounds given in Theorem 6.
APPENDIX A DUALITY THEORY
In this appendix, we collect technical results concerning trace duality of linear codes in F m×n used throughout the paper. Some of the results are taken or expanded from the literature, and some are new. Recall first the definition of trace product and dual of a linear code in F m×n (Definition 15). First, since the trace product in F m×n coincides with the usual inner product in F mn , it holds that
for linear codes C, D ⊆ F m×n . We have the following:
Lemma 64 (Forney's duality [16] ). Given vector spaces C, V ⊆ F m×n , it holds that
We now show that all GMWs of a linear code determine uniquely those of the corresponding dual code. Since GMWs and DGWs [34] coincide when F = F q and m = n by Theorem 9, the next result coincides with [34, Corollary 38] in such cases:
Proposition 65. Given a linear code C ⊆ F m×n with k = dim(C), and given an integer p ∈ Z, define
Then it holds that
where the union is disjoint.
The proof of this proposition can be translated word by word from the proof of [34, Corollary 38] using the monotonicity properties from Proposition 43. However, [34, Corollary 38] relies on [34, Theorem 37] , and therefore we need to extend such result to the cases F = F q or m = n. The following lemma constitutes such extension:
Lemma 66. Given a linear code C ⊆ F m×n with k = dim(C), and given 1 ≤ r ≤ k and 1 ≤ s ≤ mn − k, it holds that
Proof. Assume that equality holds for a pair of such r and s. Denote C L = C ∩ V L , for a linear subspace L ⊆ F n , and rewrite Proposition 14 as follows:
Write d M,r (C) = µ. Then Equation (17) implies that
and µ is the minimum integer with such property. Now write d M,s (C ⊥ ) = ν = n + 1 − µ. In the same way, Equation (17) implies that
On the other hand, given a subspace L ⊆ F n with dim(L) = ν, we have that
where the first equality follows from Lemma 63, and the second equality follows from Lemma 64 and Equation (2) . Therefore, it holds that
From the fact that µ is the minimum integer satisfying Equation (18) , and from Equation (19), we conclude that
Now if we interchange the roles of C and C ⊥ , and the roles of r and s, then we automatically interchange the roles of µ and n + 1 − µ, and the roles of k and mn − k. Therefore, we may also conclude that
Using the expressions r = p + k + r ′ m and s = p + s ′ m, and dividing everything by m, the previous two inequalities are, respectively
which contradict each other. Hence the lemma follows.
Observe that the duality theorem for GRWs [12] is a direct consequence of Theorem 7 and Proposition 65:
Finally, we show that the duality theorem for GHWs [42] is a consequence of Theorem 8 and Proposition 65:
Proof. We will use the notation in Proposition 65 during the whole proof. First of all, by Theorem 8 it holds that
On the other hand, from Proposition 65 it follows that
where the union is disjoint. Hence we only need to show that
. . , n and s = 1, 2, . . . , n − k.
Denote by D n ⊆ F n×n the vector space of matrices with zero components in their diagonals. It holds that ∆(C) 
On the other hand, assume that
Denote by E D the vector space of matrices obtained by replacing the elements outside the diagonal of those matrices in E by zero. If L = RSupp(E) ⊆ F n , we claim that
It is sufficient to show that dim( 
Combining Equation (20) and Equation (22), we conclude that
for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, which implies that n + 1 − d ⊥ s ∈ W p (∆(C) ⊥ ), for p = 1, 2, . . . , n, and we are done.
APPENDIX B CONSTRUCTION OF EXPLICIT SUBSPACE DESIGNS
In this appendix, we recall how to construct the subspace design formed by H 0 , H 1 , H 2 , . . . ⊆ F q m in Section V. This construction is given in [20] , based on a construction in [19] , and is explicit in the sense that it can be constructed using an algorithm of polynomial complexity on q.
Fix ε > 0 and a positive integer s such that 4sn ≤ εm, and assume that n divides m. Let d 1 = q m/n−1 , d 2 = q m/n−2 , . . . , d m/n = 1 and let γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ m/n be distinct non-zero elements of F q n . Define ⌋ , for all α ∈ F , 2) S α ∩ S β = ∅, for all distinct α, β ∈ F , and 3) |S α | = 2s⌊ Then the following implications hold:
(P 1) ⇐⇒ (P 2) ⇐⇒ (P 3) =⇒ (P 4).
Proof. First we prove (P 1) =⇒ (P 2): It follows immediately from the characterization of rank support spaces in Proposition 9, item 3. Now we prove (P 2) =⇒ (P 3): Let L = RSupp(D) ⊆ F n and L ′ = RSupp(φ(D)) ⊆ F n ′ . It holds that V L ⊆ V and V L ′ ⊆ W, and they are the smallest rank support spaces in V and W containing D and φ(D), respectively, by Lemma 8. Since φ preserves rank support spaces and their inclusions, we conclude that φ(V L ) = V L ′ , which implies that dim(L) = dim(L ′ ) by (2), and (P 3) follows. Next we prove (P 2) ⇐= (P 3): Assume that U ⊆ V is a rank support space. This means that mwt R (U) = dim(U) by (2) . Since φ satisfies (P 3) and is a vector space isomorphism, we conclude that mwt R (φ(U)) = dim(φ(U)), and thus φ(U) is a rank support space also by (2) . Similarly we may prove that, if φ(U) is a rank support space, then U is a rank support space.
Now we prove (P 3) =⇒ (P 4): Trivial from the fact that wt R ( {C} ) = Rk(C), for all C ∈ V.
Finally we prove (P 1) ⇐= (P 2): Denote dim(V) = dim(W) = mk and consider bases of V and W as in Proposition 9, item 2. By defining vector space isomorphisms F m×k −→ V and W −→ F m×k , sending such bases to the canonical basis of F m×k , we see that we only need to prove the result for the particular case V = W = F m×n . Denote by E i,j ∈ F m×n the matrices in the canonical basis, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, that is, E i,j has 1 in its (i, j)-th component, and zeroes in its other components.
Consider the rank support space U j = E 1,j , E 2,j , . . . , E m,j ⊆ F m×n , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Since φ(U j ) is a rank support space, it has a basis B i,j , i = 1, 2, . . . , m, as in Proposition 9, item 2, for a vector b j ∈ F n . This means that φ(E i,j ) = s,i , and B ∈ F n×n whose j-th row is b j , then a simple calculation shows that φ(E i,j ) = A (j) E i,j B, and the matrices A (j) and B are invertible. If we prove that there exist non-zero λ j ∈ F with A (j) = λ j A (1) , for j = 2, 3, . . . , n, then we are done, since we can take the vectors λ j b j instead of b j , define A = A (1) , and then it holds that φ(E i,j ) = AE i,j B, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , m and j = 1, 2, . . . , n, implying (P 1).
To this end, we first denote by a (j) i ∈ F m the i-th column in A (j) (written as a row vector). Observe that we have already proven that φ preserves ranks. Hence Rk(φ(E i,j + E i,1 )) = 1, which means that Rk(A (j) E i,j +A (1) E i,1 ) = 1, which implies that there exist λ i,j ∈ F with a (j) i = λ i,j a i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, are linearly independent, we conclude that λ i,j depends only on j and not on i, and we are done.
APPENDIX D MATRIX MODULES
Rank support spaces can also be seen as left submodules of the left module F m×n over the (non-commutative) ring F m×m . This has been used in Example 62. Since we think this result is of interest by itself, we include the characterization in this appendix.
Definition 70 (Matrix modules). We say that a set V ⊆ F m×n is a matrix module if 1) V + W ∈ V, for every V, W ∈ V, and 2) M V ∈ V, for every M ∈ F m×m and every V ∈ V.
Proposition 71. A set V ⊆ F m×n is a rank support space if, and only if, it is a matrix module.
Proof. Assume that V is a rank support space. Using the characterization in Proposition 9, item 3, it is trivial to see that V is a matrix module.
Assume now that V is a matrix module. It holds that V is a vector space. Let L = RSupp(V), and take v ∈ L. There exist V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V s ∈ V and v j ∈ Row(V j ), for j = 1, 2, . . . , s, such that v = s j=1 v j . For fixed 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ s, it is well-known that there exists M i,j ∈ F m×m such that M i,j V j has v j as its i-th row and the rest of its rows are zero vectors. Since V is closed under sums of matrices, we conclude that V L ⊆ V and therefore both are equal.
